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Abstract
We show that armed conﬂict aﬀects social capital as measured by trust
and associational membership. Using the case of Uganda and two rounds
of nationally representative individual-level data bracketing a large num-
ber of battle events, we ﬁnd that self-reported generalized trust and as-
sociational membership decreased during the conﬂict in districts in which
battle events took place. Exploiting the diﬀerent timing of two distinct
waves of violence, we provide suggestive evidence for a rapid recovery of
social capital. Evidence from a variety of identiﬁcation strategies, includ-
ing diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence and instrumental variable estimates, suggests
that these relationships are causal.
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11 Introduction
We hope to increase the understanding of the legacy of civil war by analyzing
the impact of the Ugandan armed conﬂict on social capital. What is the impact
of civil war on social networks? How does violence aﬀect trust? Providing an
answer to these questions is important for conﬂict researchers for a number of
reasons.
First, it is argued that diﬀerences among societies in culture the prevailing
values, attitudes, and beliefs contribute to diﬀerences in economic outcomes.
Social capital, which is a broad characterization of culture, is one of the aspects
considered. In the seminal work by Putnam (1993), social capital is deﬁned as
“the features of social life, networks, norms and trust that enable participants to
act together more eﬀectively to pursue shared objectives”. Social capital arises
when people interact in a number of settings, ranging from membership in an
organization to attendance at religious services and to dinner with a group of
friends. Since a person is less likely to cheat someone who is a member of his
social network, social capital makes people more trustworthy (Coleman 1988).
And, vice versa, trust is a prerequisite for building social networks. For these
reasons, trust is often associated with the value of social networks (Fukuyama
2000).
Following Putnam (1993), several scholars have focused on the role of so-
cial capital in shaping economic performance (Colletta and Cullen 2000, Sobel
2002, Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Because huge resources would have to be
devoted to making sure that people keep their promises in a society with low
social capital and low reliance on a person to keep his word, economic activity
would be greatly reduced. However, high levels of trust in a society would re-
duce transaction costs and private protection costs, thereby providing stronger
incentives for investment and innovation and improving government functioning
(Colletta and Cullen 2000). Early cross-country studies conﬁrmed the positive
association between social capital, trust and indicators of economic performance
(Knack and Keefer 1995, 1997, Zak and Knack 2001, Guiso et al. 2004). And,
2in the new growth literature, these aspects of culture are considered to be fun-
damental drivers of economic growth, i.e., as having the potential to lift the
economy to a higher level of growth (Weil 2009).
Second, social capital may be particularly relevant for the economic devel-
opment of countries with weak formal institutions, which countries host most
of the present-day civil wars (Blattman and Miguel 2010). In these countries,
the vacuum left by the absence of formal institutions may be ﬁlled in part
by informal institutions that overcome coordination failure. For example, a
well-networked society may provide a solid base for mutual aid and informal
insurance and facilitate the ﬂow of information and collective action (because
people who already have a relationship with each other can trust one another
to do their part in a joint enterprise). Furthermore, social capital may stimu-
late the accountability of ill-functioning governments. People who care about
their fellow community members may be more likely to vote. Thus, politicians
in an environment where social capital is high may be less inclined to abuse
their constituents for personal gain.1 This functioning of social capital may be
welfare enhancing, as is suggested by the ﬁndings of several empirical studies in
developing countries that report a positive impact of social capital on household
expenditure, access to credit, public-service provision, and the adoption of new
technologies in agriculture (Grootaert et al. 2002, Isham 2002, Narayan and
Pritchett 1999).
Third, although culture is generally perceived as sticky and able to change
only slowly, there is a strong prior that armed conﬂict and massive violence can
aﬀect certain aspects of social capital. A recent study by Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) provides some support for this prior as it establishes a link between 400
years of slave trade and the development of a culture of mistrust in Africa that
persists to this day. Scholars have highlighted the crucial role of interstate wars,
e.g. World War II, in shaping national identity and state-building as it reinforces
1However, if social capital is formed at the subgroup level, for example, according to ethnic
or regional origin, then it may serve as an instrument of exclusion and polarization rather than
an instrument of social gain and cohesion (Fafchamps, 2006).
3social cohesiveness and collective action both within and across states (Hanson
2003). However, civil wars, which are fought between opposing factions in a
society, are often thought to be disruptive of the society’s social fabric thus
endangering its political stability and economic recovery (Colletta and Cullen
2000, Collier et al. 2003).
This rather pessimistic view has been challenged by recent micro-level stud-
ies. Studying the aftermath of the 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone, Bellows
and Miguel (2006, 2009) have shown that victimization during the conﬂict in-
creased political participation. In particular, households directly experiencing
displacement or more intense violence were more likely to attend community
meetings, join political and community groups, and vote. Similar ﬁndings have
been presented by Blattman (2009) who investigated the impact of rebel con-
scription by abduction on post-war social and political participation in Uganda.
His analysis suggests that the level of violence witnessed during the war as
an abductee leads to more participation in political life but does not aﬀect
membership in non-political organizations. In another recent study, Voors et
al. (2010) reported that individuals who experienced violence during the 1993-
2003 civil war in Burundi displayed more altruistic behavior in the post-war
period. Finally, Bozzoli et al. (2010), studied the impact of conﬂict on expec-
tations. Relying on a 2007 survey conducted in northern Uganda, they found
that timing matters: whereas negative expectations prevailed shortly after the
experience of conﬂict, optimistic expectations were positively related to conﬂict
intensity in the distant past. Some of these more optimistic ﬁndings may appear
counter-intuitive, but they are, in fact, compatible with the results of a num-
ber of studies on post-traumatic behavior that suggest that individual tragedies
may lead to personal growth and socio-political activation (Carmil and Breznitz
1991, Tedeschi and Calhoun 1996, Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004).
In sum, although most scholars would agree on the importance of under-
standing the impact of civil war on diﬀerent aspects of culture, the scarce
evidence available is mixed. Moreover, little is known about the underlying
mechanisms, the persistence of the impact, and the possible heterogeneity of
4the impact related to the nature of civil war. This is also stressed by Blattman
and Miguel (2010), who, in their recent discussion on civil war, argue that “the
social and institutional legacies of conﬂict are arguably the most important but
the least understood of all war impacts”.
The contribution of the present article to this nascent body of literature is
threefold. First, our work represents the ﬁrst study, based on micro-level data,
of the impact of civil war on social capital as measured by trust and associational
membership.2 Second, it is the ﬁrst study on less tangible outcomes of civil war
that can rely on two rounds of data compilation, one of which took place before
the bulk of the violence occurred. This unique data set, bracketing a peak in
violence of more than 250 battle days in a year in the aﬀected area, allows us to
adopt a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation by studying the change in trust and
associational membership upon a continuous treatment equal to the number of
district-level battle days. Finally, exploiting the geographic variation as well as
the variation in timing of two distinct waves of violence, we provide suggestive
evidence as regards the duration of the impact.
Our ﬁndings indicate that both self-reported trust and associational mem-
bership decrease substantially during the conﬂict in the aﬀected districts. We
also found suggestive evidence of a strong recovery process once the violence
has ended. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation method, along with the in-
clusion of several district- and individual-level controls, provides a solid base for
our empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the potential issue of endogeneity of con-
ﬂict intensity remains in establishing a causal eﬀect of violence on social capital.
Violence may be the consequence rather than the cause of decreased levels of
trust and participation in associations, because, for instance, rebel recruitment
may be easier in regions plagued by antagonistic feelings. Although, as argued
by Blattman (2009), this is far-fetched in the northern Ugandan context, where
a large share of the Lords Resistance Army was composed of abducted youths,
we adopt distance measures to instrument for conﬂict intensity following the
2In a related paper, we investigate the impact of conﬂict on political participation in
Uganda (De Luca and Verpoorten 2011).
5recent empirical literature on civil war.3 The IV estimations broadly conﬁrm
the OLS ﬁndings.
In the next section, we present the data and provide relevant background
information on the armed conﬂict in Uganda. In section 3, we present our
empirical strategy. The OLS results are presented in section 4, and in section 5
we turn to the IV strategy. The last section concludes.
2 Data and Background
2.1 Social capital
The data on social capital is taken from Afrobarometer (AB), an independent,
non-partisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic
atmosphere in Africa. We use two rounds of AB survey data compiled in Uganda
in 2000 and 2005. 4 Each survey includes information on approximately 2,400
individuals of voting age. The samples are nationally representative and geo-
graphically stratiﬁed across 33 districts in 4 regions, including both urban and
rural areas. Figure 1 gives an administrative map of Uganda in 2000, and Table
A1 lists the districts by region. In Table 1, we give the number of observations
per region and per survey year, which show that all four administrative regions
of Uganda are well represented in both survey years. 5
Figure 1 about here
Table 1 about here
3See, for example, Akresh and De Walque (2008), Miguel and Roland forthcoming, Serneels
and Verpoorten (2010), Voors et al. (2010).
4We do not use the 2002 and 2008 AB surveys. The 2002 survey does not cover the
districts most aﬀected by the civil war, while the questions on social capital included in the
2008 survey are not comparable to those in the 2000 and 2005 surveys (for details on the
survey instruments, we refer to www.afrobarometer.org).
5The four administrative regions are denominated: Central, Eastern, Northern, and West-
ern.
6The AB surveys include questions on two interrelated dimensions of social
capital: trust and associational membership. We restrict our analysis to ﬁve
questions one on trust and four on membership that are comparable across the
survey rounds in terms of question formulation and response categories. The
question on trust concerns the respondent’s level of trust of others in general and
is formulated as follows: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?” The
answer categories are “You must be very careful”(coded as 0), and “Most people
can be trusted”(coded as 1). The questions on membership are introduced as
follows: “Now I am going to read out a list of voluntary organizations. For each
one, could you tell me whether you are an oﬃcial leader, an active member,
an inactive member, or not a member of that type of organization?” The list of
organizations includes (i) a religious organization like a church or a mosque, (ii) a
trade union or farmer’s organization, (iii) a professional or business organization,
and (iv) a development association. We code the answer categories as follows:
(0) Not a member, (1) Inactive member, (2) Active member, and (3) Oﬃcial
leader. In the empirical analysis, we check the robustness of our results against
diﬀerent ways of coding the answers.
A summary of the social capital variables and the diﬀerent codings is pro-
vided in Table 2. We ﬁnd rather low levels of trust with less than 20% of the
respondents answering that most people can be trusted. Membership is highest
in religious organizations, with more than 80% of the respondents reporting that
they were a member of a religious organization (inactive, active or leading). The
other types of organizations only involve the membership of 20% to 30% of the
population. Over time, the reported levels of social capital are rather stable. On
average, generalized trust increases by 2 percentage points, and membership of
a religious organization increases slightly from 80% to 83%, but these changes
are not signiﬁcant. Larger and signiﬁcant changes take place in membership
in a trade union/farmer organization (a decrease of 13 percentage points), a
professional/business organization (a decrease of 8 percentage points), and a
community development organization (an increase of 6 percentage points). It is
7noteworthy that there are large diﬀerences across regions despite the relatively
small changes in the averages. For example, self-reported trust increased by 10
percentage points in the western region, while it decreased by 12 percentage
points in the northern region.
Table 2 about here
2.2 The Conﬂict
The conﬂict intensity data are taken from the Armed Conﬂict Locations Events
Data (ACLED), which provides geo-referenced information on approximately
3,921 violent events in Uganda between 1960 and 2010 (Raleigh et al. 2010).6
The violent events include battles between armed groups (2,659) or attacks on
civilians (1,262). These events took place on 1,983 diﬀerent days within the
50-year period. Hence, on average, a year counts almost 40 event days, and an
event day counts 1.98 violent events. The bulk of these event days more than
90% took place after 1995. We situate them on a timeline in Figure 2.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 indicates that, after a period of relative peace following the power
seizure by Museveni in 1986, the number of event days started to rise in 1995.
This increase occurred on two fronts. First, in northern Uganda, the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA), an armed opposition group founded in 1987 by Joseph
Kony as able to intensify its activities in 1995 mainly because of support by the
Sudanese government (Dolan 2009).7
6Two separate ACLED datasets for Uganda were released, one recording events between
1960 and 2006, and one recording events between 1997 and 2010. We merged the two datasets
and removed the duplicate observations in the overlapping period 1997-2006.
7Kony’s movement gathered armed groups reluctant to settle with Kampala’s new govern-
ment and was initially called the Lord’s Salvation Army, then the United Democratic Christian
Forces, and eventually, from 1994 onward, the Lord’s Resistance Army (Allen 2006, Doom
and Vlassenroot 1999). The LRA received assistance from Sudan in retaliation for Ugandan
support of a rebel group operating in southern Sudan.
8Second, in western Uganda, another armed group the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF) commenced its activities in the mid-nineties. The ADF was a
fundamentalist Islamic guerrilla group formed by various remnant rebels from
Uganda, Congo, and Rwanda (Boas 2004). They operated mainly from the
Ruwenzori Mountains bordering with Congo and received support from both
the Congolese and Sudanese governments (Behrend 2007).
In Figure 2, we distinguish between the number of event days with LRA
and ADF involvement. Whereas both groups started to increase their activities
in the mid-nineties, the peaks and ends of their activities occurred at diﬀerent
times. The activities of the ADF were inﬂuenced by conﬂict trends in the
neighboring DRC and were mostly concentrated in the period from 1997 to 2001.
By 2002, relative degree of peace had been established in western Uganda. The
bulk of LRA violence, instead, fully unraveled in the period 2002-2005 following
a military operation in southern Sudan by the Ugandan army the “Iron Fist”
intended to destroy the LRA supply bases (Dolan 2009). LRA bases were,
indeed, destroyed and many rebels killed. The mission was, however, considered
a failure (Allen 2006, Dolan 2009). In fact, LRA forces managed to outﬂank
the Ugandan army and attacked further south in Ugandan districts until then
relatively untouched by the conﬂict (e.g., Apac and Lira). Starting from 2006,
however, the area of LRA activities ﬁrst moved out of Uganda into southern
Sudan and into the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006-2008) and then further
west reaching the Central African Republic after 2008 (Accord 2010). This
released the pressure on civilians and opened the way to a recovery in northern
Uganda.
2.3 Linking social capital to the conﬂict
To construct our dataset, we merged the AB data with the ACLED data at the
district level, which is the smallest administrative unit they have in common.
Doing so yields a dataset of approximately 4,500 individual level observations
across 33 districts. In what follows, we will use the ACLED conﬂict data as a
9treatment to study the change in social capital upon conﬂict. Before doing so,
three issues have to be discussed.
First, it is evident from Figure 2 that ADF violence peaked before the 2000
AB baseline survey, was still fairly high in 2001 and 2002, and then ceased such
that by the time the 2005 survey was carried out, ADF operations had come
to an end. When we single out the eﬀect of ADF violence, therefore, we can
interpret our results as the eﬀect of conﬂict cessation on social capital with
respect to the baseline survey collected amidst the violence. In other words, the
ADF treatment captures post-war recovery.
Second, although LRA violence escalated after our baseline year, a non-
negligible number of battle days took place before 2000. This pre-2000 LRA ac-
tivity was largely conﬁned to one particular geographic region, “Acholiland”(Kitgum
and Gulu Districts), while LRA violence outside Acholiland only took oﬀ after
2000. Hence, while the estimated LRA treatment should be interpreted as
the impact of continued and escalating violence on social capital, a somewhat
cleaner treatment eﬀect can be discerned when focusing on LRA activities out-
side Acholiland. This point is illustrated in Figure 3, which gives the number of
event days with LRA involvement inside and outside Acholiland for the period
1986-2010.8
Figure 3 about here
Finally, that the AB survey was conducted in times of violence as well as
amidst a huge refugee crisis following violence raises the issue of sample selec-
tion bias. For instance, because of insecurity, the surveys may have excluded
the most aﬀected individuals in certain districts. In order to verify this, we
consulted the local AB team that conducted the survey. We learned that, when
an enumeration area within a district was highly insecure, the enumeration area
was replaced by a more secure area within the same district. The substitution
8Notice that the average intensity of LRA violence experienced outside Acholi districts
before 2000 is fairly close to nil, as the violence reported in Figure 3 was spread across 7
districts (see Appendix A1 for a detailed distribution of violence by district).
10always followed the composition of the original sample in terms of language and
ethnicity as well as the direction of displacement of the individuals in the origi-
nal sample, often ending up with a sample of within-district internally displaced
people (IDP) (correspondence with Francis Kibirige 2011). This approach was
facilitated by the maintenance of local administrative structures in the IDP
camps and also by the moving of the IDP within their own district. Conse-
quently, we can be fairly conﬁdent that the AB survey is representative at the
district level for each survey year.
3 Empirical strategy
To identify the impact of violence on social capital, we use a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimation that exploits variation in the event days across districts
and over time. The treatment is a continuous variable equal to the event days
occurring between the implementation of the 2000 and 2005 AB surveys. The
treated group are the households located in the districts where the battles and
attacks took place. In other words, the empirical identiﬁcation strategy relies
on the comparison of the change in social capital in 2000-2005 across areas with
low violence intensity and areas with high violence intensity.
Formally, the empirical model can be written as follows:
Si,t,d = α1Bd + α2yeart + α3(Bd ∗ yeart) (1)
+X′
i,t,dΨ + X′
t,dΘ + ηr + εi,t,d
where i indexes individuals, d districts, r regions and t survey years. The
variable Si,t,d denotes individual-level social capital. Bd denotes logged event
days per district in the period 2000-2005; and yeart is an indicator variable
taking one for respondents in the 2005 survey. Thus, the coeﬃcient of interest
is α3, which is the coeﬃcient of the interaction term between Bd and yeart.
To reduce heterogeneity across the observations on social capital, we control for
a number of relevant individual-level and district-level covariates. The vector
Xi,t,d denotes a set of individual-level covariates, including the respondent’s
11age, the age squared, a gender indicator variable, an indicator variable that
equals one if the respondent lives in an urban location, ten ﬁxed eﬀects for the
respondent’s ethnicity, and nine ﬁxed eﬀects for the educational attainment of
the respondent (all recorded in the AB). The vector Xt,d denotes a set of district
level covariates, which include historical battle days experienced in the period
1960-2000 (taken from ACLED) and ethnic fractionalization.9 Both variables
may aﬀect the level of trust in the baseline year. In the robustness checks, we
show that neither of these district-level controls is critical for our results.
These explanatory variables are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3 about here
Finally, ηr denotes regional ﬁxed eﬀects, which are included to capture
region-speciﬁc unobserved factors that may aﬀect social capital and εi,t,d is
the standardized error term. In order to account for a potential correlation of
these errors within districts and within years, we adjust the standard errors for
two-way clustering as suggested by Cameron et al. (2006).
Since the answer categories for the social capital questions in the AB surveys
are categorical, we have the option between two diﬀerent estimation strategies.
First, we can maintain the categorical nature of the answers and estimate an
ordered probit model. Second, we can estimate our empirical model by OLS,
treating the categorical answer as if they were part of a continuous scale. We use
the latter approach in the baseline result and report the former as a robustness
check.10
To account for the diﬀerent timing of the violent events, we estimate an
expanded model in which we distinguish three diﬀerent types of violence: LRA
violence in Acholi districts (LA), LRA violence in non-Acholi districts (LN),
and ADF violence (AD). Formally, we replace Bd in Eq. 1 by B
j
d, with j =
9Ethnic fractionalization is taken from the 1991 Ugandan population census accessed
through IPUMS at the Minnesota Population Center.
10One advantage of using OLS is that it allows us to estimate the standard IV model. This
is also the approach taken by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) in their analysis of the AB trust
data.
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where α5, α6 and α7 are the coeﬃcients of interest. In this speciﬁcation, the
vector Xt,d now also includes the interaction term of ethnic fractionalization
in 1991 and the 2005 year dummy. By doing so, we can rule out that the
diﬀerential impacts we may ﬁnd across the three types of violence are due to
diﬀerent degrees of ethnic heterogeneity across the aﬀected districts. Again, this
district-level control is not critical for our results.
As noted above, LRA activities exploded in 2002 but aﬀected Acholi districts
already before 2000, albeit to a lesser degree. Hence, we interpret the coeﬃcient
α5 on the interaction term BLA
d ∗yeart as the eﬀect of additional and escalating
violence on social capital. The LRA activities reached further south only after
2002, which allows us to interpret α6 on the interaction term BLN
d ∗ yeart as
the impact of violence on social capital relative to a situation without a direct
confrontation with violence. Finally, the coeﬃcient α7 on the interaction term
BAD
d ∗yeart captures the change in social capital when moving from a situation
amidst violence into a post-war phase.
With respect to these coeﬃcients of interest, we formulate two intuitively
appealing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Both the start and the escalation of LRA violence reduce social
capital. α5 < 0 and α6 < 0.
Hypothesis 2. The ending of ADF violence is associated with an increase in
social capital. α7 > 0.
Thus, we hypothesize that violence reduces social capital and that, once the
violence ends, social capital recovers. It is much less intuitive to conjecture
about the relative magnitude of the coeﬃcients. For instance, if the start of
13violence reduces social capital more than the escalation of violence, then then
|α5| < |α6|. On the other hand, if the escalating violence reaches a very high
intensity, the reverse may be true, |α5| > |α6|.
4 OLS estimates
4.1 Baseline results
Table 4 shows the results of estimating Eq. 1, i.e., when all types of violence
(LRA and ADF event days) are pooled together. There are no sizable eﬀects of
violence on the level of generalized trust and on the associational membership,
except for a signiﬁcantly negative impact on membership in religious organiza-
tions. However, as argued above, it is more appropriate to separate ADF- and
LRA- related violence as well as LRA violence inside and outside Acholiland.
Table 4 about here
Table 5 shows the estimation results of Equation 2 when the three types of
violence are distinguished. Consider ﬁrst the treatment eﬀect associated with
LRA violence in Acholiland. The estimated coeﬃcient α5 indicates a decrease in
associational membership (Columns 2-5), but no signiﬁcant impact on general-
ized trust (Column 1). The estimated treatment eﬀect of LRA violence outside
Acholiland, α6, indicates a signiﬁcant decrease in generalized trust as well as
associational membership of religious groups and community/development orga-
nizations but is insigniﬁcant in explaining the change in membership in economic
associations (trade/farmer & professional/business).
Table 5 about here
Finally, for ADF violence, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant impact for all
social capital variables considered (α7 > 0), indicating that individuals living in
the ADF-targeted districts reported higher levels of trust and greater involve-
ment in all types of association in peaceful 2005 than in war-torn 2000.
14Overall, these results are in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2 formulated above.
Hypothesis 1 is, however, only partially conﬁrmed since α5, although negative,
is not estimated signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in explaining the change in
generalized trust. In contrast, α6 is estimated negative and signiﬁcant, indicat-
ing that trust is negatively aﬀected by LRA violence outside Acholi districts.
Thus, in the case of generalized trust |α5| < |α6|. The pattern is reversed for
associational membership, where we ﬁnd |α5| > |α6|. As pointed out above, one
explanation may be that the escalating LRA violence inside Acholiland reached
epic proportions. In fact, in the period 2000-2005, the number of event days
in an Acholiland district was more than ﬁve times as high than the number
of event days in an LRA aﬀected district outside Acholiland (see Table A1).
The concentration of intense ﬁghting in Acholiland triggered a large refugee
crisis, which may have disrupted the associational life of its residents. In con-
trast, associational life outside the Acholi districts may have been less aﬀected
given the lower exposure to intense violence and the lower degree of population
displacement.
4.2 Robustness checks
We perform two types of robustness checks. First, we test if our results hold in
subsamples of the AB data. Second, we check whether our results are robust
with respect to the use of alternative estimation models and alternative deﬁni-
tions of the main variables of interest. All results are condensed in Table 6, in
which we report only the coeﬃcients for the interaction terms of interest.
Table 6 about here
4.2.1 Subsample analysis
Our empirical strategy relies on the comparison of the change in social capital
between individuals living in heavily war-aﬀected districts and individuals living
in less aﬀected districts. Thus, these latter districts are used to proxy the
counterfactual: what would have happened if violence would not have taken
15place? This is a valid approach if both groups of districts are broadly comparable
in terms of other potential determinants of the change in social capital. To put
this approach to a test, we estimate our empirical model for two subsamples of
broadly comparable districts: (1) a sample including only the northern area to
test the impact of the LRA violence and (2) a sample only including the southern
area for testing the impact of the ADF violence. The former is a rather radical
test since it leaves us only with one third of the sample observations.
This north-south division of the sample follows the division of Uganda along
ethnolinguistic lines: the southern part is exclusively Bantu, whereas the north-
ern part is almost exclusively of Nilotic origin. In Table A1, we indicate the
districts with Bantu origin based on Lewis (2009).
The results, reported in the ﬁrst two panels of Table 6, are qualitatively the
same as our baseline results with one exception. For non-Acholi districts, the
impact on generalized trust loses signiﬁcance, which may be due to the drastic
reduction in the sample size.
4.2.2 Alternative estimation models and variable deﬁnitions
We ﬁrst estimate a more parsimonious model that excludes the district level
controls (historical battles, ethnic fractionalization and the interaction term
between the latter and the 2005 survey dummy). The results, reported in the
third panel of Table 6, are qualitatively the same as the baseline results except
for the impact of LRA violence in Acholiland on general trust, which is now
estimated to be signiﬁcantly negative (instead of insigniﬁcant).
Second, since the responses to the AB questions on trust and membership
are categorical in nature, a sensible robustness check consists in replicating the
estimations using the original categorical nature provided by the AB. Using an
(ordered) probit model produces estimates that are qualitatively identical to
our baseline OLS estimates.
We also estimate our empirical model using probit with an alternative binary
coding for our dependent variables (see Table 2 for details on the codes). The
16results are given in the ﬁfth panel of Table 6: 13 out of the 15 coeﬃcients of
interest remain qualitatively identical, and the remaining two coeﬃcients lose
signiﬁcance but do not change sign.
Finally, we repeat our main speciﬁcation measuring conﬂict intensity in two
diﬀerent ways (instead of the logged number of event days): (1) by the number
of event days, and (2) by the logged number of events. The results displayed
in the last two panels of Table 6 do not change qualitatively except for the
impact of LRA violence in Acholiland on the generalized trust level, which is
now weakly signiﬁcant (instead of insigniﬁcant).
5 Identifying causal relationships - IV estimates
The positive correlation between event days and the change in social capital that
is documented in the previous sections is consistent with the hypothesis that
conﬂict decreases associational membership and generalized trust. However, the
correlation could also be explained by reversed causality or by omitted variables
that are correlated both with selection into conﬂict and with changes in social
capital. In addition, it is not unlikely that conﬂict events are measured with
error, for example, because events in very remote or insecure areas may receive
little news coverage (Verpoorten 2011). If this is the case, our results may suﬀer
from an attenuation bias. To address these concerns, we turn to an instrumental
variable strategy.
We instrument for the three types of violence as well as the three interaction




d ∗ year. In order to do so, we follow the
three-step procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, p.236). In the ﬁrst step,
we predict conﬂict intensity by regressing B
j
d on the set of included instruments
as well as the set of excluded instruments, with the latter denoted by Z
j
d. Next,
the predicted conﬂict intensity variables are interacted with the post-treatment
year, ( ˆ B
j
d ∗yeart). Finally, both ( ˆ B
j
d ∗yeart) and Z
j
d are used as instruments in
a conventional 2SLS procedure, instrumenting for B
j
d and the interaction terms
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The coeﬃcients of interest are β5, β6 and β7, which capture the treatment eﬀect
of the predicted battle days on social capital.
As excluded instruments, Z
j
d, we use the 1991 district-level population share
of Acholi, the distance to Sudan, and the logged distance to the Ruwenzori
Mountains. The ﬁrst of these instruments captures LRA violence, which was
directed mainly against the Acholi.11 The second instrument is relevant because,
as part of the Sudanese support for the LRA rebels, the LRA was provided
with logistics and bases on Sudanese territory from where they organized raids.
Finally, since ADF bases were located in the Ruwenzori Mountains, where rebels
11The LRA was constituted by people of Acholi origin. Nevertheless, LRA received little
support among the Acholi population as it resorted to looting and youth abduction to sustain
itself. The situation worsened further when the government started to organize self-defense
militias in Acholi districts. The LRA leadership tagged this decision as betrayal and launched
a campaign of killing and mutilation of Acholi civilians to dissuade further collaboration with
the government army (Behrend 1999, Branch 2005.
18could easily hide and be supplied from the DRC, we expect the distance to these
mountains to be highly correlated with the location of ADF operations.
Table 7 about here
Table 8 about here
The ﬁrst stage results, reported in Table 7, indicate that the instruments are
relevant, with the estimated coeﬃcients on the instruments Z
j
d signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero in predicting ˆ B
j
d (Columns 1-6, with Columns 1-3 corresponding
to Step 1 of Wooldridges Procedure), and ˆ B
j
d ∗ year signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero when instrumenting for the interaction terms (columns 7-9). The relevance
of our instruments is conﬁrmed by the Kleibergen-Paap test for underidentiﬁca-
tion. The second stage results are qualitatively very similar to the OLS results
for most of the social capital variables. The most noteworthy change concerns
the impact of LRA violence in Acholiland on trust, which is now estimated
signiﬁcantly negative (instead of insigniﬁcant).
6 Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper adds to the small but growing body of
literature on the social and institutional legacies of civil war. Analyzing the
impact of armed conﬂict in Uganda, our ﬁndings indicate that social capital
decreases amidst violence but recovers once violence has ended. These ﬁndings
are based on two nationwide surveys that bracket the peak in LRA violence
taking place in the north and capturing the transition from violence to peace in
the west in the aftermath of ADF violence.
Measuring social capital by self-reported trust and by membership in diﬀer-
ent types of associations, we ﬁnd that both the level of trust and participation
in religious and community associations decreases when transiting from rela-
tive peace to violence. Regarding participation in economic associations (farm,
trade, business and professional voluntary organizations), the negative impact
of violence is conﬁned to Acholiland, where the conﬂict was most disruptive as
19the majority of the population was living in IDP camps to protect themselves
from LRA attacks. Finally, on a more positive note, our results are suggestive
of a strong post-violence recovery process. A few years after the end of the
ADF-related violence, the level of trust dramatically increases in the aﬀected
areas and participation ﬂourishes in all the types of voluntary organizations
considered.
Although we control for a large set of individual- and district-level covari-
ates, and although our results are stable throughout a number of robustness
checks and after controlling for possible endogeneity and attenuation bias, these
results remain tentative. First, this is obviously not an experimental setting
and the econometric techniques used cannot fully substitute for the unobserved
counterfactual: what would have happened in the absence of violence? Second,
many questions remain unanswered. What are the precise mechanisms underly-
ing our results? Does social capital bounce back to its pre-war level, fall behind
or even exceed it? How can these results be generalized to other settings with
violence of diﬀerent forms and duration? To answer these questions, more data
points are needed from more countries on more forms of violence.
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